

Detection of Selective Forwarding Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks: A Survey

J. Anne Shirley¹, J. John Raybin Jose²

¹Research Scholar, Department of Computer Science, Bishop Heber College (Autonomous), Tiruchirappalli, India

²Asst. Professor & Head, Department of Information Technology, Bishop Heber College (Autonomous), Tiruchirappalli, India

Abstract: A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) consists of distributed autonomous devices that monitor both physical and environmental conditions. Sensor Networks are used for weather prediction and measuring temperature, sound, wave, vibration, pressure etc. Sensor Networks suffer from various security attacks like (i) sink hole attack, (ii) black hole attack, (iii) wormhole attack and (iv) selective forwarding attacks. Selective forwarding attack happens in compromised nodes by dropping packets selectively. This paper surveys various techniques for detecting selective forwarding attacks in WSNs.

Keywords: Wireless Sensor Network, Selective Forwarding Attacks, Compromised Nodes, CHEMAS Technique, Lightweight Defense Scheme, Watermark Technology.

1. Introduction

Wireless sensor network is a self-configuring network of small sensor nodes which communicate with each other using radio signals. WSN joins together sensing, computation and communication in a single device called as sensor nodes. Wireless sensor nodes are also called as motes. In WSN, sensor nodes are used to send packets to a base station with the help of multi-hop transmission. Sensor nodes are classified into clusters and each of these clusters has a cluster head, it's shown in Fig1. Through cluster heads, sensor nodes communicate data to the base station by combining data from its members [1]. Wireless Sensor Networks are used in ocean and wildlife monitoring, manufacturing machinery performance monitoring, building safety and earthquake monitoring, vehicular movement etc. Due to resource constraints of energy and memory, the conventional security measures are not suitable to these wireless sensor networks. An adversary can compromise a sensor node, it alters the integrity of the data, eavesdrop on messages, inject fake messages, and waste network resources. Unlike wired networks, wireless nodes broadcast their messages to the medium. In wired network, there will not be any security problem but not so with Wireless network.

Attacks against wireless sensor networks could be broadly considered from two different levels of views.

1. The attack against security mechanisms.
2. The attack against routing mechanisms.




Figure 1: Wireless Sensor Network

Attack Models

Several security attacks exist in Wireless Sensor Networks and they are,

1. Dos attack
2. Sink hole attack
3. Black hole attack
4. Wormhole attack
5. Selective forwarding attacks.
6. Sybil attacks
7. Sybil attacks
8. Node replication attacks
9. Hello flood attack

The main objective of this paper is to give an overview for researchers and developers on different techniques available to prevent Selective Forwarding Attack. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 present the overview of selective forwarding attack and its types. Section 3 classifies the previous works on Selective Forwarding Attack. Section 4 gives the future research directions. The final section concludes this paper.

2. Selective Forwarding Attack

The selective forwarding Attack was first described by Karlof and Wagner [3]. Selective Forwarding Attack is a network layer attack [2]. In this type of the attack compromised nodes drop particular sensitive messages and forward the rest. It is difficult to identify the compromised node in the whole network.

Selective forwarding attacks are most effective when the attacker is explicitly included on the path of a data flow. Selective forwarding and black hole attacks are very disastrous attacks for sensor networks if used with sinkhole attack because the intruder can drop most of the important packets. Further classification of this attack is inside attack and outside attack. Inside attack occurs within the network through compromised nodes and outside attack occurs from outside of the network by jamming the communication channels between uncompromised nodes.

2.1 Different Forms of Selective Forwarding Attack

There are different forms of selective forwarding attack. In the First form of the selective forwarding attack, the compromised node drops some packets. In its Second form, the Selective forwarding attack behaves like a Black hole, in which the message is forwards to the wrong path, creating false routing information in the network. Third form of selective forwarding attack delays packet passing through the network creating confused routing information between sensor nodes [3].

3. Related Work

Various techniques are introduced by several researchers to detect malicious nodes that cause selective forwarding attack in Wireless Sensor Networks. These techniques are classified and depicted below in fig 2.




Figure 2: Classification of Selective Forwarding Attack Techniques

3.1 CHEMAS Technique

The Checkpoint Based Multi-hop Acknowledgement Scheme (CHEMAS) was proposed by Bin Xiao et al., to detect selective forwarding attack. When message is generated by a source node and is delivered to the base station, the checkpoint nodes are selected randomly. The base station and each checkpoint nodes generate acknowledgement (ACK) message that is transmitted from the start node to the source node. ACK messages have the Time to Live (TTL) value, which sets the hop count. If TTL becomes zero, ACK message is dropped and an alert message is sent to the source node. If a particular node

does not send ACK message to the source then it is identified as the compromised node. Then the source node sends an alarm message about the compromised node to the base station.

Ji Won Kim, et al., [5] in their research work, have proposed another technique for the Checkpoint Based Multi-hob Acknowledgement Scheme (CHEMAS) to detect the compromise nodes that perform a selective forwarding attack when sensing data transmission. This paper has achieved a higher detection ratio through each checkpoint node and it generates acknowledgement message to confirm the normal packet. However, if more number of check nodes is presented, then the checking time of the packet transferred will increase and so there will be a time delay in reaching the destination.

Ji Won Kim, et al., [11] in their work, have presented a control method of checkpoint node selection using a fuzzy rule system and feedback in the Checkpoint Based Multi-hob Acknowledgement Scheme (CHEMAS). The sink node and each checkpoint node generate acknowledgement (ACK) packets to confirm normal packet delivery. If a node has not received sufficient ACK packets, then the nodes generates an alert packet to report the suspect node. Compromised nodes can be detected by analyzing the alert information reported. However, it increases communication.

3.2 Defense Mechanism

Defensive technique for selective forwarding attack consists of three phases for secure information delivery. In first phase the node discovers a path and its neighbor nodes, in second phase, data is propagated in multipath, it checks whether the data received is correct or not, and in the final phase if any error is detected then a MONITOR packet is generated and the malicious node is removed.

Geethu P C and Rameez Mohammed A., [4] in their research work, have described a multipath routing scheme that is used as defense mechanism against selective forwarding attack. When a node detects packet drop during the routing, it will resend the packet through alternate route, as the resending mechanism reliability of the routing scheme improves then Packet is retransmits through another alternate path. If that path is busy with some other transaction, it leads to time delay and there is a chance for jamming and this is the Limitation of this work.

Pandarinath P., [10] in his research work, has given defensive technique for selective forwarding attack in localization. This technique utilizes secret sharing of information and this information is shared between source and destination using secret sharing algorithm. This algorithm is not suitable for all situations. This algorithm takes more time to execute when more nodes are participating.

Arpita Parida, et al., [6] have introduced a Defensive technique, if any attack is encountered then a monitor packet is generated and subsequently the malicious node is

removed. It finds a new path so that the connection will not to be lost and also good delivery ratio can avoid delays. When the path increases, the energy consumption also increases simultaneously.

3.3 Lightweight Defense Scheme

Lightweight security scheme is used to detect selective forwarding attack using multi hop acknowledgement technique. This scheme allows both the base station and source nodes to collect attack alarm information from intermediate nodes. In other words, though the base station is deafened by malicious node the source node can make decisions and responses. The scheme can efficiently obtain those alarm information whenever intermediate nodes in a packet forwarding path detect any malicious packet dropping.

Wang Xin-sheng, et al., [8] in their research work, have proposed a light weight defense scheme against selective forwarding attack which uses neighbor nodes as monitor nodes. The neighbor nodes (monitoring nodes) monitor the transmission of packet drops and resend the dropped packets using a hexagonal WSN mesh topology. Limitation of this paper is that if there is any change in topology, it will affect the performance of the scheme as it is assumed that after development the nodes will not change their location.

Xie Lei et al., [9] in their research work, have described polynomial modeling based on countermeasure against selective forwarding attack and a security scheme using redundant data to tolerate the loss of messages. The basic idea is to split the original data into small parts and forward these parts to the base station. Forwarding nodes cannot understand the contents of the data generated by the polynomial, which can prevent eaves dropping and so sensor nodes in the network cannot be compromised. Finally, before the sensor nodes are deployed, every node shares a unique symmetric key with the base station. However, dividing and processing the original data packet into small sizes leads to extra storage.

3.4 Watermark Technology

The digital watermarking technology is used to calculate the rate of packets of dropped and modified. Each sensor node can send only a few bits at a time and so the length of watermark embedded into the data should be very short. The source node generates the watermark W with key K and the feature of the original data. Then the source node embeds the watermark into the original data and transfers it through the media. When the packets reach the Base Station, it the Base Station obtains the feature of the packets and generates the watermark W_1 by watermark generation algorithm, then the Base Station extracts the watermark directly from the received packets by Watermark embedding algorithm denoted as W_2 ; finally the packet modified rate is calculate by comparing the W_1 and W_2 .

Deng-yin ZHANGa, et al., [7] in their research work, have presented a technique based on digital watermarking

technology. This method embeds watermark into the source data packets, and extracted them at the base station without any packet loss. The malicious node prevented from dropping the data. The limitation of this scheme is that it cannot detect more than two malicious nodes on the single path.

Baowei Wang, et al., [12] in their research work, have proposed a novel multiple watermarking method called Multi-mark. This technique provided privacy, security, and saved storage space and the amount of data transmitted. Multi-mark is a network structure-free scheme, which can be easily and efficiently applied to the resource limited sensor networks.

4. Future Research Directions

In the existing Defensive technique algorithm, a single static path is created for sending packets to the sink node in the network. When an attack is identified, server removes the malicious node and the packets are retransmitted through the new shortest path without losing the connection. This technique can be further enhanced by hiding the packets using the secret sharing algorithm. This approach leads to less conception of energy, good delivery ratio and avoids delays.

5. Conclusion

The Checkpoint Based Multi-hop Acknowledgement Scheme (CHEMAS) technique is very effective technique for malicious node detection to compare with any other techniques. In CHEMAS, the selection probability of checkpoint is an important factor to determine the security intensity and energy efficiency. The proposed method enhances detection ratio with similar energy consumption to the original CHEMAS scheme. Secure transaction is very difficult in wireless sensor network. This paper surveys various effective detection techniques for selective forwarding attack in WSN, proposed by various researchers. This analysis will facilitate to know the drawbacks in the earlier schemes and will help to overcome the drawbacks in the future.

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