The Influence of Risk Preference on the Game Behavior of Electricity Retailers

Mingyuan Xing

Abstract: With the continuous promotion of China's electricity sales side reform, electricity retailers need to continuously optimize their decisions to adapt to the new market mechanism, therefore, it is of great significance to conduct corresponding strategic research. In this paper, the non-cooperative game with a limited number of electricity retailers is used to simulate the competitive market environment, and the multi-retailer game model is constructed considering conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). The retailer purchases electricity through the bilateral contract, centralized competitive trading, and day-ahead spot market, and conducts risk measurement based on CVaR; the interaction between electricity retailers and electricity customers is indirectly described by the Logit market share function. Finally, the simulation case is designed to verify the effectiveness of the model and analyze the influence of risk preference on the game behavior of electricity retailers, it is concluded that the more risk-averse the electricity retailer is, the more inclined they are to set higher retail electricity price and tend to purchase less electricity from the day-ahead spot market with more price fluctuations while obtaining lower market share and expected profit.

Keywords: Retail electricity market, Multi-retailers, Conditional value at risk, Game